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Abstract 
The Great Recession resulting from the globalization of Finance Capitalism created 
two structural labor crises for developed economies: 1) The channeling of 
substantial investment into non-productive, paper commodities, reducing growth of 
production for use and therefore reducing available aggregate job creation; and 2) 
The continued exportation of industrial jobs to other lower cost jurisdictions, and 
outsourcing, automation, just-in-time production, and speed-ups associated with 
global supply chains. As a result, local communities and regional populations have 
destabilized and even collapsed with attendant social problems. One possible 
response is Community Syndicalism – local community finance and operating credit 
for industrial production combined with democratic worker ownership and control of 
production. The result would increase investment directly for production, retain jobs 
in existing population centers, promote job skilling, and retain tax bases for local 
services and income supporting local businesses, at the same time increasing 
support for authentic political democracy by rendering the exploitive ideology of the 
Public/Private distinction superfluous. Slowing job exportation may reduce the 
global race to the bottom of labor standards and differential wage rates reducing 
the return to producers of value and increasing the skew of income distribution 
undermining social wages and welfare worldwide. Community Syndicalism can 
serve as moral goal in an alternative production model focusing incentives on long 
term stability of jobs and community economic base. 
Key words 
Law; economics; sociology ethics; politics; cooperatives; democratic control; 
syndicalism; United States. 
                                                 
Article presented at the Conference on The Social Economy. Corporate Responsibility, Private Property & 
Partnerships. Workers' Rights and Cooperatives, held at the International Institute for the Sociology of 
Law, Oñati, Spain, and as part of the Summer Courses Programme of the UPV/EHU, 6-8 July 2011. 
∗ Kenneth M. Casebeer is Professor of Law and Director of the Employment, Labor, and Immigration 
Certificate, at the University of Miami School of Law. He is the author of American Labor Struggles and 
Law Histories (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2011) and Work Law in American Society, 2nd ed. 
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2011) with Gary Minda. 467 University of Miami Law School. 1311 
Miller Drive. Coral Gables FL 33124. USA. casebeer@law.miami.edu 
Kenneth M. Casebeer  Community Syndicalism for the United States… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 2, n. 2 (2012) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 90 
Resumen 
La Gran Recesión que ha traído la globalización del capitalismo financiero ha dado 
lugar a dos crisis laborales estructurales en las economías desarrolladas: 1) El 
destino principal de la inversión hacia bienes no productivos, reduciendo la 
producción de bienes de consumo, y reduciendo también las posibilidades de 
creación de puestos de trabajo, y 2) el traslado de puestos de trabajo industriales a 
otras jurisdicciones para reducir costes, y la externalización, la automatización, la 
producción "justo a tiempo", y las prisas relacionadas con las cadenas de suministro 
globales. Como resultado, las comunidades locales y poblaciones regionales se han 
desestabilizado e incluso colapsado, con los consiguientes problemas sociales. Una 
posible respuesta es el sindicalismo comunitario –la comunidad local financia y 
concede crédito para la producción industrial, combinándolo con medidas 
democráticas de propiedad de los trabajadores y de control de la producción–. Así, 
se lograría aumentar la inversión directa en producción, mantener puestos de 
trabajo en los centros de población existentes, promover la mejora de las 
competencias de empleo, y aumentar los impuestos destinados a servicios locales y 
a apoyar a empresas locales. Al mismo tiempo, se aumenta el apoyo a una 
democracia política real, haciendo que resulte superflua la ideología explotadora de 
la distinción entre público/privado. El freno de la deslocalización del trabajo puede 
reducir la tendencia global de pérdida de la calidad del empleo y las diferencias 
salariales. Ambos problemas dificultan la vuelta a la producción de valor, y 
aumentan la diferencia salarial, deteriorando los sueldos sociales y el bienestar en 
todo el mundo. El sindicalismo comunitario puede servir como objetivo moral de un 
modelo alternativo de producción, centrado en los incentivos para lograr a largo 
plazo estabilidad laboral y base económica para la comunidad. 
Palabras clave 
Derecho; economía; sociología; ética; política; cooperativas; control democrático; 
sindicalismo; Estados Unidos. 
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The economic renewal will be moral or it will not exist. The 
moral revolution will be economic or it will not take place. 
Don Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta 
Economic globalization is a fact and material condition of modern society. There will 
be no going back to purely local economies. At the same time, the future of 
participatory democracy depends upon “localizing” leverage within this global 
market. Otherwise autonomy will be ephemeral. Such leverage will depend upon 
new economic and moral changes embodied in new economic and legal institutions. 
One possible response is Community Syndicalism – local community finance and 
operating credit for industrial production combined with, but separate from, linked 
democratic worker ownership and control of production -- investment capital assets 
held separately from enterprise ownership and control. The result would increase 
investment directly for production, retain jobs in existing population centers, 
promote job skilling, and retain tax bases for local services and income supporting 
local businesses, at the same time increasing support for authentic political 
democracy by rendering the exploitive ideology of the Public/Private distinction 
superfluous. After analyzing Community Syndicalism as a moral/economic model, 
this paper will explore the future viability of worker ownership or cooperatives in 
the United States including the law affecting their viability, identify necessary legal 
changes in U.S. law, and outline global legal/political impacts of Community 
Syndicalism. It should be noted at the beginning that the ascendency of the political 
Right under the banner of the “Tea-Party” in local and state government currently 
in the United States probably makes Community Syndicalism a political 
impossibility now. Yet, current conditions underlying the need for “third-way” 
solutions (Ellerman 1982) will only deteriorate in the mid-term future, and there is 
no reason to avoid planning for inevitable change. 
1. Structural challenges to developed economies embedded in financial 
globalization 
Threatening developed economies, the Great Recession resulting from the 
globalization of Finance Capitalism created two structural labor crises for developed 
economies: 1) The channeling of substantial investment into non-productive, 
speculative, paper commodities, due in large part to hyper-inequalities in wealth, 
and entailing reduced growth of production for use and therefore reduced available 
aggregate job creation in the developed economies (Foster 2010). This impact was 
noted as early as 1986 (Swinney and Metzgar 1986). When the finance bubbles 
burst, more than 11,800,000 jobs were lost in the United States alone, and this 
jobs gap is not closing with finance sector bail out and recovery. At present 
optimistic job creation rates (which are about double current job creation) it will 
take over 12 years to return to pre-recession employment levels (Greenstone and 
Looney 2010b). 2) The continued exportation of industrial jobs from the United 
States to other lower cost of production nations, and the outsourcing, automation, 
just-in-time production, and speed-ups associated with investments spurring 
dispersion of global supply chains create excess global productive capacity (Foster 
2010). Beyond short term corporate incentives (greed) to exploit low wage, 
underdeveloped regions, excess capacity will reinforce lower standardized wages 
worldwide. In turn, this will make new investment in production and therefore jobs 
in developed countries more unlikely in the future.  
As a result, local communities and regional populations in the United States have 
destabilized, and even collapsed, with many attendant social problems (Greenstone 
and Looney 2010a; Wilson 1996). Of course all structural economic change will be 
accompanied by dislocations associated with local economies, however, recent 
dislocations have not proven to be subject to temporary readjustments. Twenty 
years after the 1980’s recession,  
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[t]he net loss to a displaced worker with six years of job tenure is approximately 
$164,000, which exceeds 20 percent of the average lifetime earnings of these 
workers. These future earnings losses dwarf the losses associated from the period 
of unemployment itself. … [J]ob loss also has negative economic and noneconomic 
effects on workers health, their families and their communities. Men with high 
levels of seniority when they are displaced from their jobs experience mortality 
rates in the year after unemployment 50 to 100 percent higher than otherwise 
would be expected. … These elevated rates of mortality are still evident even 
twenty years after the job loss and may reduce these workers’ life expectancies by 
twelve to eighteen months for a worker who loses his job at age forty. 
The children of these workers also appear to suffer. Children whose fathers were 
displaced have annual earnings about 9 percent lower than similar children whose 
fathers did not experience an employment shock. (Greenstone and Looney 2010a). 
Ironically, the collapse of the mortgage market as a result of the bursting of the 
securitized mortgage bubble has worsened the personal welfare of workers in 
declining communities by making their houses unsellable, making re-location to 
communities with available jobs of any kind infeasible (Greenstone and Looney 
2010a). 
Some may wonder why a neutral observer should care about welfare declines and 
local destabilization in developed countries and certainly the United States? If not 
just desserts, then at least for developing countries as recipients of new capital 
flows creating jobs formerly located in developed economies, their citizens’ welfare 
is increased even as the new job holders are exploited by payment of substandard 
wages under substandard conditions of production. Something is better than 
nothing, which is of course what capital managers are counting on. There are two 
reasons to care. 1). Stabilizing production to some extent in developed economies 
slows the now frenetic race to the bottom of labor standards promoted by capital 
managers playing developing countries against each other. 2). An economic 
enterprise model needs to be established and proven that changes the priority of 
incentives based on production for use. The goal is not profit maximization but 
economic stabilization (Hanratty 1986-87). The first reason is both macro-economic 
and morally distributive in the long run. The second reason is micro-economic in 
incentives and rationality but moral as well in redefining rights to work, and 
mutuality of relations, equality and democratic participation. Both aims suggest 
middle-range responses to the crises in developed countries. This requires a change 
in economic agency not the abandonment of markets. 
2. Community syndicalism as a moral/economic response to structural 
dislocation 
Community Syndicalism will not be a quick fix. The key to breaking the conceptual 
roadblock to reversing local economic decline is to institutionalize the incentive to 
invest in job maximizing production that maximizes long-term stability and 
continuity of those jobs, and minimizes short-term profit seeking at the expense of 
long-term stability. Investment incentives must be turned upside down. 
Furthermore, these new investments largely will have to be from the distressed 
locality to that same locality. Outsiders won’t be interested. (This may seem like 
squeezing blood from a stone). Furthermore, regarding hoped for economic spinoff 
of new local production, known as the local strategy of import substitution, “the 
base for the healthiest and most sustainable growth is the development of 
increasing numbers of firms that buy from and sell to one another as they create a 
labor market with increasingly skilled workers and technical and professional 
people.” (Jacobs 1984). Thus, first, the incentive to invest needs to be collectivized 
locally so that investment flows are not solely directed by short-term return to 
individualized investors. “[S]o long as we treat the public good of investment as a 
private for-profit activity coordinated by individual banks and investment 
companies[,] ‘Speculative finance’ [Hyman] Minsky argues, is the problem; reliance 
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on financial markets creates economic instability and discourages real innovation 
and investment.” (Friedman 2010).  
In Community Syndicalism – local community start-up finance and operating credit 
for industrial production combines with, but is separate from, linked democratic 
worker ownership and control of production. Community funding and ownership, 
coupled with worker control was the intent behind the closest attempt proposed in 
the U.S. thus far -- the Steel Valley Authority attempt to use the public power of 
eminent domain in the Pittsburgh region during the 1980s (Hornack and Lynd 
1986-87). Community Syndicalism differs in two important aspects: First, the aim 
is not takeover of failing or closing plants as with S.V.A.; Second, splitting 
community investment in and ownership of capital assets, from worker ownership 
and democratic control of the enterprise, contribute synergistically to long term 
viability. Both the community (economic base) and the workers (sustainable jobs) 
desire stabilization in the labor market. (Simon 1991). The “Private” capitalist 
economy may be driven by short-term maximization of return, but Community 
Syndicates assume long-term viability.  
How can this new model be generated? Start with the economic problem. Local 
communities or regional populations have been devastated by the decline of 
industrial production, whether the disappearance of enterprise that formed the 
economic base of those communities resulted from competitive failure or by 
outsourcing of some or all of the production from the affected area. Community 
economics of course are not limited to the base firm. Hundreds of small businesses, 
community non-profits, local taxes for services, even big-box retailers, and supply 
chain production, depend upon resident incomes. “A dearth of good jobs in 
distressed communities leads to high unemployment and stagnant wages. Evidence 
shows that certain place-based policies can help attract business investment to 
targeted areas and can boost the productivity and wages of workers in those 
areas.” (Looney and Greenstone 2010). The key is jobs, and not just minimum 
wage jobs, but jobs that approximate the number and wage level of the production 
drain. Moreover, to rekindle the local economy, new jobs need to be anchored to 
the community. “Employee ownership helps anchor capital in local communities 
because employee-owners usually reside in the community in which they work and 
their interests, as residents and employee-owners, coincide with those of the 
community. Employee ownership is therefore a valuable tool for aiding economic 
development strategies which value both the geographic stability and the quality of 
employment opportunities created.” (Olson 1986-87). For counter example, 
computerized service jobs can always be easily relocated to another community. 
What is needed is the formation of new production creating large numbers of jobs 
within modern, flexible production modalities. Existing capital formations are 
unlikely candidates as the source of the necessary new investment.  
Will it work? There is reason to believe that much deindustrialization and job 
exportation is driven by short-term profit and inability to compete in world financial 
markets. “Many plants are closed not because they fail to make a profit, but 
because they fail to make enough profit to hold the decision-maker’s interest when 
compared to some other marginally more profitable opportunity. When 
management fails to reinvest and modernize, productivity and profit margins most 
often do decline, thereby reinforcing the initial, casual decisions whose rhetoric 
often either places blame at the feet of labor, or speaks of these developments as if 
they constituted some natural and inevitable evolutionary path beyond anyone’s 
control.” (Ansley 1993). High wage, retained earnings, but no profit requirement, 
coupled with high productivity, could allow such syndicates to be market 
competitive and achieve long-term supply chain relations, especially within non-
profit global production networks (Lindenfeld 1982; Swinney 1985). 
Those left behind thus have strong economic incentive to act but no clear agency. 
For example, the economic spillover effects on community economies are not 
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captured by the private investor market (Greenstone and Looney 2010a). The 
community or region needs capital pooling. Traditional sources include local 
industrial revenue bonds, state abatements or investment funds, and grants from 
non-profits. The Naugatuck Valley Project in Connecticut created a revolving fund to 
support worker buyouts from credit unions, churches, unions, and other institutions 
(Brecher 1986). These sources, however, have been substantially diminished since 
the initial enthusiasm for financing worker buyouts of failing industries in the early 
1980’s waned. State and local tax incentives to private enterprise may result in 
initial private enterprise investment but have not captured those enterprises long-
term because such incentives do not change community against community races 
to the bottom dynamics (Greenstone and Looney 2010a; Crouch 1986). Yet, there 
may still be unused land or buildings available in unfinished local industrial parks. 
The Tri-State Conference on Steel in Pittsburgh has proposed land trusts owning 
land and buildings, leasing to private enterprises (Lynd 1990). 
3. The community in community syndicalism 
More likely, capital contributions would have to be raised by rolling but not 
permanent taxes on business franchises in the area. Local private banks may be 
induced to provide long-term, low interest loans if local residents are willing to 
withdraw personal and business accounts from banks declining to participate 
(Brecher 1986). Businesses paying franchise taxes might not object to participating 
in pooled leverage because they are already “paying” in another way. 1 “When you 
lose 1,000 manufacturing jobs, you lose an additional 1,000 jobs in the service 
economy. You put the following service companies out of business: 17 eating 
places, 13 food stores, 11 gas stations, 6 apparel shops, 3 automobile dealerships, 
2 hardware stores, 2 drug stores, 1 sports store, 1 jewelry store, 17 doctors and 5 
dentists, and an unknown number of teachers, government employees, etc.” (Stout 
1986). 
A local community investment fund under democratic elected management, legally 
limited to investing in local syndicates would control pooled resources. Initial capital 
needs would likely be great because the purchase of production technology would 
be necessary to generate numbers of jobs. It is key to make the investment fund 
debt obligations minimal. Furthermore, after start-up, additional capital must be 
raised to provide operating credit.  
Why would communities want to generate substantial capital pooling? Most directly, 
for survival: to recreate a tax base, to save small businesses and community 
organizations such as churches, to reduce the servicing costs of social morbidity. 
While lacking economic agency to support worker ownership, political agency is 
longstanding: “This movement includes community organizations, urban political 
organizations, religious organizations, unemployed organizations, and others who 
are responding to the reality of very high levels of unemployment.” (Swinney 
1985). Secondarily, the community would acquire new assets in the form of land, 
buildings, and machinery. The investment fund would have title to these capital 
assets unless bought from it later by the worker enterprises themselves. In the 
case of enterprise failure, the fund would have these basic assets to begin anew. 
Eventually, it might be hoped that worker and enterprise deposits would grow to 
support a subsidiary mutual bank that might be the source of future investments 
without taxing the community. In 1959, four years after the first cooperative was 
established in Mondragon, Spain, the corporation created the Caja Laboral Popular, 
which has grown to become the fourth largest bank by assets in Spain. (Azevedo 
and Gitahy 2010). 
4. The syndical in community syndicalism 
Splitting asset ownership from enterprise ownership is the conceptual advance of 
community syndicalism. Once planning by political communities and potential 
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worker groups have identified a viable long-term market niche, an investment pool 
can be initiated. At this point or shortly thereafter worker organizations may form 
coalitions to “bid” (by virtue of viability of proposed business plans) on the 
enterprise value of the enterprise. The capital assets of the fund would be “leased” 
at nominal value for the period of the enterprise existence. The workers initially or 
subsequently employed would own the enterprise on a one share, one vote basis 
and generate any necessary management committee by democratic choice. Worker 
ownership and control not only permits but is crucial to stability. “If employees own 
the firm, they will not shut it, or move it to Mexico, after a disappointing quarter, or 
a failure to meet a growth target, or simply because they have failed to attain a 30 
per cent market share.” (Hyde 1993). There should be no incentives created to 
allow the local community to pull out capital assets or for workers to view 
participation as a transitory job rather than continuing ownership of the enterprise. 
Thus day to day management could be delegated under periodic democratic 
oversight meetings. This organizational model worked reasonably well in the 
Northwest plywood cooperatives. (Berman 1982). 
Following the Mondragon experience, a parallel “social council” structure (or union) 
would mediate any differences arising between workers as owners and workers as 
workers. However, such differences, while perhaps inevitable about short-term 
value distributions as opposed to long-term retained earning reinvestment, are 
likely also to be reduced by eliminating the ownership/employee legal separation 
(Whyte and Whyte 1988). 
By eliminating the need of the enterprise for more than variable cost coverage 
including relatively high monthly distributions to workers (replacing wages), plus 
some retained earnings for production improvement and flexibility, the enterprise 
should gain cost competitiveness against private enterprises forced to produce 
world competitive (not minimum) short-term profits for investors (Lindenfeld 
1982), and the coverage of initial asset investments for start-ups, even where 
competitors gain their advantage from low wage labor exploitation. 
5. The past failures of worker cooperatives in the United States is largely a 
problem of access to capital 
Worker cooperatives have historically only been able to succeed in the United 
States in limited sectors for limited periods. The longest surviving cooperatives 
have clustered in small, service delivery, or small-scale consumer production firms 
(Curl 2009; Shirom 2001). Curl estimates that there are roughly 300 worker 
cooperatives currently operating in the United States. In such firms initial 
capitalization may be low, and coordination of management costs among a small 
number of workers also low, with little hierarchy associated with specialization.  
Attempts to sustain large industrial cooperatives have failed most directly for three 
reasons: 1) Economics of start-up: In the 1970’s, worker ownership, sometimes as 
cooperatives, were pushed as a way of buying out failing industries where no other 
buyer emerged to continue the enterprise, and thus the workers’ jobs. This was 
cooperative by desperation. Predictably, failing industries usually failed, sometimes 
because of former ownership stripping of assets or neglect of re-investment or 
paying of investor dividends instead of retained earnings (Hyde 1992). 2) Access to 
operating capital: Early cooperatives in the Nineteenth century, and more recent 
industrial attempts, have failed not because initial capital could not be found, but 
because additional, conventional credit lines could not be secured for short-term 
production costs or modernization (Curl 2009). Private banks by and large have 
more profitable short-term loans available, or at least perceive loan options as less 
risky. “One of the major difficulties faced by worker cooperatives and worker owned 
firms has been access to financial capital. Without the ability to borrow for purposes 
of meeting short term cash flow needs or long-term expansion, these firms have 
faced substantial difficulties in surviving and competing in the marketplace.” (Levin 
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1984). Both some truth and some self-fulfilling prophecy lead to bank choices. 3) 
Legal inflexibility in transition: Especially large cooperatives face difficult issues with 
labor attrition or turnover. Existing laws and the accompanying economic incentives 
often force marketable worker ownership shares to revert to non-participant 
shareholders. Over time the cooperative reverts to a public stock corporation. This 
has been the fate for many of the plywood cooperatives in the Northwest United 
States (Greenberg 1984; Berman 1982). It should be clear that these are barriers 
to success of any large worker owned and democratically managed enterprises.  
Note this article does not consider individual worker stock purchases, or the sham 
ownership involved in the increasing number of Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs) even those owning (but not controlling) a majority share of stock shares. 
By splitting ownership (workers) from control (remains with management) ESOPS 
have been primarily used as anti-takeover or last-ditch capital raising devices, often 
in failing enterprises (Bagchi 2008). 
Nevertheless, the political structure of federalism in the United States makes past 
successful organizational examples of worker ownership elsewhere more or less 
inapplicable to what would be needed in the United States, as well. The paper thus 
casts some doubt on the universalization of the Mondragon experience in developed 
country contexts, while applauding the Mondragon example, sharing its aims, and 
adapting its practices where context is favorable. In contrast, Community 
Syndicalism: 1. Would be located in locally distressed and deindustrialized 
communities; 2. Would not be subsidized from the regular State budget; 3. Would 
most likely be aimed initially at creating single enterprises aside from cooperative 
networks; 4. Would not raise capital from workers, who after all are unemployed in 
distressed communities; 5. Would still depend on the State budget for pensions and 
social insurance for workers; 6. Would require all employees to be or to become 
owners; 7. Would be established with no connection to the educational system, and 
aside from being in distressed communities, face hostility from the larger society. 
8. Would have to learn different relations contrasted to the adversary nature of the 
larger culture’s normal management/worker hostility. 
But if this model catches on, won’t communities not in decline turn to Community 
Syndicalism and by competition reduce the value of the new model. First, such a 
defeat is devoutly to be wished for (Despite the great success of the Mondragon 
system, cooperatives still comprise less than 1 percent of the Spanish economy) 
(Moye 1993). Three results would follow. One, economic incentives would switch to 
maximize long-term stability (better for the world and earth) (Lynd 1990). Second, 
the public versus private realm distinction underwriting massive worldwide wealth 
concentration and inequality would be undermined (as if public resources were not 
used to underwrite private wealth accumulation already by differential taxing and 
subsidy) (Klare 1988; Reich 2010). Such public subsidy in “profitable” communities 
would then be in direct political tradeoff with job creation and community stability. 
Third, the experience of something approaching full democratic participation at 
work is likely to be a spreading malady leading to greater democratizing of political 
participation in non-market arenas. “Clearly, a strong case can be made for 
bringing greater democracy into the workplace in order to create a citizenry that 
participates in all of the major areas affecting its daily circumstances and its 
future.” (Gamson and Levin 1984; Whyte and Whyte 1988). Too many tears would 
not be shed for private capital. Furthermore, traditional short-term competitive 
return may well be appropriate for high-risk production, research and development, 
organizational or product innovation, and other economic sectors, and thus likely to 
continue. 
Some leaders in the labor movement decry worker ownership because worker 
owned firms are claimed to pacify workers as owners and undercut union wages 
(Slott 1985). However, this outcome is unlikely to follow where worker managed 
enterprises are a) created to inhabit long term market niches generating relatively 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 2, n. 2 (2012) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 
97 
Kenneth M. Casebeer  Community Syndicalism for the United States… 
 
high wage jobs and b) generated in failing communities particularly where 
unionized employment has previously fled. Ownership of enterprise democratically 
managed in fact may well increase social militancy. 
Such a development becomes more practicable, of course, with the expansion of 
networks of such firms, for example in Basque Spain (Whyte and Whyte 1988). As 
of 2008, the network of cooperatives centered in Mondragon, Spain contained “106 
cooperatives, with 97, 773 workers, and a total invoice of 15.6 billion euros.” 
(Azevedo and Gitahy 2010). However, even with single enterprises in a local 
community, extensive planning and market analysis by independent intellectual 
cadres would be necessary to support workable community syndicates given the 
costs of potential failure of such enterprises, the inability to easily diversify, and the 
need to build-in production flexibility and adaptation for long-term job preservation. 
The major difficulties in reaching systemic networked outcomes are mainly political 
– coordination costs of multi-location divisions of enterprise labor within global 
supply chains. These coordination issues have certainly been of great recent 
concern to the Mondragon cooperative network (Azevedo and Gitahy 2010). 
6. Legal changes in the United States 
A) To structure the legality of worker enterprise ownership, little needs to be done. 
Virtually all states have already modified their incorporation statutes to allow 
licensing of cooperative ownership (Ellerman and Pitegoff 1982-83). Modifications 
of organizational management subject to owner control useful to the specific 
enterprise can be established voluntarily in corporate bylaws (Cummings 1999). 
Long-term nominal leases of assets and provision of financing in subsidy of local 
production is also standard practice. There is no policy reason except resistance by 
private enterprises to new competition to prevent extension of favorable national 
and local tax treatment given to other employee ownership forms such as ESOPs 
(Cummings 1999). 
B) More legal changes would be needed to preserve community syndicates, 
particularly to recognize the asset ownership – enterprise ownership separation. 
First, a local mechanism is needed for taxing those enterprises expected to benefit 
from new production and jobs in advance of those benefits to provide for initial 
investment. This is difficult where the workforce is divided into local municipalities, 
sometimes crossing state borders. After long negotiations this obstacle was 
overcome via a unique provision of state law under the Tri-State Steel Valley 
Authority in the 1980’s. The authority was empowered to acquire failing steel plants 
through eminent domain, and continue production through an agreement to fund 
acquisitions agreed to by nine supporting communities. Some plants were targeted, 
but none were ultimately operated by the Authority. Initial Steel plants targeted for 
eminent domain takeovers by the Authority ultimately were not purchased because 
of a failure of funding, particularly for investing in new plant equipment to make the 
plants competitive, reinvestment ignored by prior private ownership bent on milking 
the plants until the inevitable end (Stout 1986). Building up an ongoing tax value 
capture structure admittedly will be difficult politically given the collective need to 
bet on the future, but in an economically declining community what real choice is 
there other than abandonment. 
Second, a special tax and borrowing jurisdiction would be needed. Such specialized 
political institutions have frequently been established to govern water distribution in 
the Western United States. (Lee 1983). Raising the capital pool and creating the 
community district to hold the capital assets would solve the main barriers to entry 
for successful industrial worker ownership cooperatives by separating investment 
capital needs from enterprise returns, and providing a reliable source for ongoing 
credit draws. These twin barriers have led to most worker ownership and control 
market failures in the United States. 
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The politics of governing the investment pool funds should be institutionally 
separated from short-term changes in political party leadership of the community in 
general. Many Community Development Agencies have foundered by succumbing to 
short-term political forces structured into the enterprises that were developed by 
the CDAs (Kreiner 1986-87). Short-term demands and political log rolling involved 
in general policymaking should not intrude on the single minded long term resolve 
of enterprise stability. In instances where local entities have sat on the boards of 
cooperatives in return for funding support, the results for the cooperatives have not 
been positive except perhaps in the housing area. The special district should be 
restricted to using its funds in support of local, cooperative enterprises. Funds must 
be available for both asset investment and operating capital lines of credit. Perhaps 
a minimal amount of funds could be authorized for other investments in order to 
assure funds for the District’s own operational needs. Leasing of the district’s assets 
must be guaranteed for the duration of the enterprise in order to prevent the 
district from withdrawing capital assets earlier on purely political grounds. 
Determination of the point of enterprise failure triggering district asset recapture 
would either have to be specified in creating the district or in the terms of the lease 
requirements. 
C). Another problem to be addressed legally involves maintaining worker 
management which has proven problematic in production cooperatives in the 
United States. Professor Henry Hansmann has predicted the failure of industrial 
production enterprises managed democratically based on substantial coordination 
costs of large corporation management (Hansmann 1990). The more specialized 
and hierarchical the internal division of labor, and the greater number of workers 
involved in industrial production, the greater the coordination costs (informational 
and divisional) occasioned by democratic forms. He is willing to concede consumer 
service delivery and shop based small scale firms can more easily overcome these 
transaction costs and survive if their capitalization costs are also relatively low – 
everyone tends to do the same thing and debt can be retired more quickly easing 
turnover problems (Hyde 1992). Undoubtedly, there is some truth to the 
transaction costs of democratic decisions, and that is why direct democratic micro-
management of day to day production decisions is impossible. However, Hansmann 
discounts offsetting productivity gains due to worker input and productivity gains 
due to ownership and loyalty stakes in the enterprise. Historically, “For the same 
level of capital investment, the cooperatives had far higher labor productivity than 
comparable capitalist firms. (Jackall and Levin 1984). In the plywood cooperatives, 
worker owners often were rotated through different stages of production in order to 
educate each owner about the enterprise as a whole. “[B]roadly speaking, it is 
those clusters of [Producer Cooperatives] with the most cooperative features – 
particularly the plywood and cooperage PCs – that have the longest life, the best 
economic performance, and the best record of maintaining a cooperative structure 
over time.” (Jones 1984). As is well known, the Mondragon cooperatives engage in 
extensive worker education, and also utilize interacting and overlapping hierarchies 
of democratic decision-making (Whyte and Whyte 1988). Of course this is costly 
particularly in terms of time, and generally goes without full compensation of 
management decisions. Just as maximizing short-term profit is not necessarily the 
most important goal of economic life unless we choose to embed it in law, so is 
absolute minimization of transaction costs not inscribed naturally. Nothing more has 
been established but that democracy and equality have some allocation costs. 
Related to firm management, a more technical legal problem is workforce 
transitions or enterprise labor turnover. The main benefit of enterprise ownership is 
job stability, and perhaps an increase in the number of stable jobs. Indeed one of 
the aims of separation of asset ownership and enterprise ownership is to remove 
the incentive of any cohort of worker owners to liquidate the capital assets of the 
enterprise and cash out the enterprise (Bagchi 2008). Alternatively, enterprise 
value is mostly found in the income stream. This in turn reduces the magnitude, 
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but doesn’t eliminate the problem of share transfer. In the past, cooperatives have 
sometimes repurchased owner shares at current market value for owners who were 
leaving or retiring or deceased. The purchased shares are then sold to new workers 
or retained by the enterprise with returns apportioned to remaining owners pro 
rata. However market repurchase can escalate to prohibitive prices, particularly 
related to capital asset appreciation. Escalating market value of shares often forced 
sale to non-worker shareholders, and over time the enterprise returned to ordinary 
stock corporations. Given split ownership, that is not a cognizable option for 
community syndicates. Other cooperatives such as Mondragon have stabilized the 
share price for longstanding and new jobholders, but created undistributed share 
accounts for each owner that increase with longevity or value contribution. When a 
shareholder eventually severs their connection to the cooperative, the accumulated 
individual fund is paid out. In some sense the worker’s accumulation operates 
similarly to a defined contribution pension fund in the United States (although 
Mondragon workers have an additional pension fund). This plan allows movement in 
and out of the cooperative but also has drawbacks. This approach does not consider 
risks undertaken by early worker-owners and fails to compensate owners for the 
appreciation in the value of the enterprise over time except as accumulation based 
on labor time. It thus depends on a strong culture of commitment to cooperation 
that may be diminishing among younger entrants. 
The project of job stability based on enterprise stability should not incentivize easy 
exit. That is part of the tradeoff justifying replacing lost local jobs, an assumption of 
lessened mobility. If the community has bought in, the worker-owner can be 
expected to make a similar commitment foregoing some degree of mobility. “Legal 
and economic arrangements that make it more difficult or costly for parties to 
withdraw from the relationship may serve as safeguards that induce firm-specific 
human capital investments by reducing the risk of subsequent opportunistic 
withdrawal.” (Simon 1991). Of course, this idea cannot justify involuntary 
servitude. But perhaps a sliding scale exit penalty reducing market value 
repurchase payout could be justified based on length of service to the firm, at least 
if exit is not due to retirement or incapacity. Of course, nothing prevents an 
enterprise generating surplus revenues successfully earned above costs and/or 
periodic and generous distributions, from also funding defined payment 
accumulation accounts as well. Also, there is justification for some share 
appreciation for well-established enterprises, because new entrant worker-owners 
are taking less risk, and early workers are more likely to have made sacrifices in 
distributions stemming from early debts incurred in establishing supply chain 
connections and reputation. Furthermore, the lack of appreciation of share value 
equity may be less disruptive within the Mondragon core area because of the 
extensive acculturation of workers before they join a cooperative enterprise. Share 
control and turnover can be part of the enterprise bylaws, but some limitation on 
transferability may need to be legislated to respect community capitalization and 
aggregate job stabilization. 
The new enterprises should not be thought to be static. In fact production flexibility 
should be planned into the enterprise from the beginning to adapt production 
inputs, process, and products to changing markets. Worker-owners whose jobs are 
eliminated or technologically changed should be retrained and assigned within the 
enterprise with costs covered by normal attrition. That too will enhance labor force 
stability. 
7. Conclusion 
Community Syndicalism is not a panacea for local communities destabilized by job 
loss. It is not state socialism, public ownership and direction of all the means of 
production; certainly not bureaucratic socialism; if anything, it could be described 
as market socialism, but this is not really accurate. It is simply an alternative model 
of economic enterprise organization as yet untried. The United States cannot simply 
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replicate Mondragon given the lack of an established internal bank or financing 
mechanism from within a larger cooperative structure, outside any existing 
cooperative network or cultural experience, and facing hostility from the 
educational system under separate federal jurisdictions, and within an adversarial 
society committed to individualistic capitalism. But within the margins of desperate 
distressed communities, under mostly available local legal mechanisms, it may be 
possible to demonstrate a different moral-economic alternative paralleling the 
Mondragon strategy. By splitting asset ownership from enterprise ownership it is 
possible to re-incentivize production for long-term stability of aggregate jobs; 
refocus on production for use; provide the tax and economic base for local 
institutions; localize participation in globalization of product markets and reduce the 
race to the bottom of labor standards; increase the experience of democratic 
participation affecting other areas of social life; and put the lie to the fictional 
public/private distinction underwriting inequality. Even under Tea-Party control of 
current politics, it is not a utopian project to begin what will follow. We need to 
make persuasive and feasible what is to be done. 
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